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Commit 59bf86e7 authored by Stuart Gathman's avatar Stuart Gathman
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Release 0.8.7

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# Revision 1.69 2006/11/04 22:09:39 customdesigned
# Another lame DSN heuristic. Block PTR cache poisoning attack.
#
# Revision 1.68 2006/10/04 03:46:01 customdesigned
# Fix defaults.
#
# Revision 1.67 2006/10/01 01:44:06 customdesigned
# case_sensitive_localpart option, more delayed bounce heuristics,
# optional smart_alias section.
#
# Revision 1.66 2006/07/26 16:42:26 customdesigned
# Support CBV timeout
#
# Revision 1.65 2006/06/21 22:22:00 customdesigned
# Handle multi-line headers in delayed dsns.
#
# Revision 1.64 2006/06/21 21:12:04 customdesigned
# More delayed reject token headers.
# Don't require HELO pass for CBV.
#
# Revision 1.63 2006/05/21 03:41:44 customdesigned
# Fail dsn
#
# Revision 1.61 2006/05/17 21:28:07 customdesigned
# Create GOSSiP record only when connection will procede to DATA.
#
# Revision 1.60 2006/05/12 16:14:48 customdesigned
# Don't require SPF pass for white/black listing mail from trusted relay.
# Support localpart wildcard for white and black lists.
#
# Revision 1.59 2006/04/06 18:14:17 customdesigned
# Check whitelist/blacklist even when not checking SPF (e.g. trusted relay).
#
# Revision 1.58 2006/03/10 20:52:49 customdesigned
# Use re to recognize failure DSNs.
#
# Revision 1.57 2006/03/07 20:50:54 customdesigned
# Use signed Message-ID in delayed reject to blacklist senders
#
# Revision 1.56 2006/02/24 02:12:54 customdesigned
# Properly report hard PermError (lax mode fails also) by always setting
# perm_error attribute with PermError exception. Improve reporting of
# invalid domain PermError.
#
# Revision 1.55 2006/02/17 05:04:29 customdesigned
# Use SRS sign domain list.
# Accept but do not use for training whitelisted senders without SPF pass.
# Immediate rejection of unsigned bounces.
#
# Revision 1.54 2006/02/16 02:16:36 customdesigned
# User specific SPF receiver policy.
#
# Revision 1.53 2006/02/12 04:15:01 customdesigned
# Remove spf dependency for iniplist
#
# Revision 1.52 2006/02/12 02:12:08 customdesigned
# Use CIDR notation for internal connect list.
#
# Revision 1.51 2006/02/12 01:13:58 customdesigned
# Don't check rcpt user list when signed MFROM.
#
# Revision 1.50 2006/02/09 20:39:43 customdesigned
# Use CIDR notation for trusted_relay iplist
#
# Revision 1.49 2006/01/30 23:14:48 customdesigned
# put back eom condition
#
# Revision 1.48 2006/01/12 20:31:24 customdesigned
# Accelerate training via whitelist and blacklist.
#
# Revision 1.47 2005/12/29 04:49:10 customdesigned
# Do not auto-whitelist autoreplys
#
# Revision 1.46 2005/12/28 20:17:29 customdesigned
# Expire and renew AddrCache entries
#
# Revision 1.45 2005/12/23 22:34:46 customdesigned
# Put guessed result in separate header.
#
# Revision 1.44 2005/12/23 21:47:07 customdesigned
# Move Received-SPF header to top.
#
# Revision 1.43 2005/12/09 16:54:01 customdesigned
# Select neutral DSN template for best_guess
#
# Revision 1.42 2005/12/01 22:42:32 customdesigned
# improve gossip support.
# Initialize srs_domain from srs.srs config property. Should probably
# always block unsigned DSN when signing all.
#
# Revision 1.41 2005/12/01 18:59:25 customdesigned
# Fix neutral policy. pobox.com -> openspf.org
#
# Revision 1.40 2005/11/07 21:22:35 customdesigned
# GOSSiP support, local database only.
#
# Revision 1.39 2005/10/31 00:04:58 customdesigned
# Simple implementation of trusted_forwarder list. Inefficient for
# more than 1 or 2 entries.
#
# Revision 1.38 2005/10/28 19:36:54 customdesigned
# Don't check internal_domains for trusted_relay.
#
# Revision 1.37 2005/10/28 09:30:49 customdesigned
# Do not send quarantine DSN when sender is DSN.
#
# Revision 1.36 2005/10/23 16:01:29 customdesigned
# Consider MAIL FROM a match for supply_sender when a subdomain of From or Sender
#
# Revision 1.35 2005/10/20 18:47:27 customdesigned
# Configure auto_whitelist senders.
#
# Revision 1.34 2005/10/19 21:07:49 customdesigned
# access.db stores keys in lower case
#
# Revision 1.33 2005/10/19 19:37:50 customdesigned
# Train screener on whitelisted messages.
#
# Revision 1.32 2005/10/14 16:17:31 customdesigned
# Auto whitelist refinements.
#
# Revision 1.31 2005/10/14 01:14:08 customdesigned
# Auto whitelist feature.
#
# Revision 1.30 2005/10/12 16:36:30 customdesigned
# Release 0.8.3
#
# Revision 1.29 2005/10/11 22:50:07 customdesigned
# Always check HELO except for SPF pass, temperror.
#
# Revision 1.28 2005/10/10 23:50:20 customdesigned
# Use logging module to make logging threadsafe (avoid splitting log lines)
#
# Revision 1.27 2005/10/10 20:15:33 customdesigned
# Configure SPF policy via sendmail access file.
#
# Revision 1.26 2005/10/07 03:23:40 customdesigned
# Banned users option. Experimental feature to supply Sender when
# missing and MFROM domain doesn't match From. Log cipher bits for
# SMTP AUTH. Sketch access file feature.
#
# Revision 1.25 2005/09/08 03:55:08 customdesigned
# Handle perverse MFROM quoting.
#
# Revision 1.24 2005/08/18 03:36:54 customdesigned
# Don't innoculate with SCREENED mail.
#
# Revision 1.23 2005/08/17 19:35:27 customdesigned
# Send DSN before adding message to quarantine.
#
# Revision 1.22 2005/08/11 22:17:58 customdesigned
# Consider SMTP AUTH connections internal.
#
# Revision 1.21 2005/08/04 21:21:31 customdesigned
# Treat fail like softfail for selected (braindead) domains.
# Treat mail according to extended processing results, but
# report any PermError that would officially result via DSN.
#
# Revision 1.20 2005/08/02 18:04:35 customdesigned
# Keep screened honeypot mail, but optionally discard honeypot only mail.
#
# Revision 1.19 2005/07/20 03:30:04 customdesigned
# Check pydspam version for honeypot, include latest pyspf changes.
#
# Revision 1.18 2005/07/17 01:25:44 customdesigned
# Log as well as use extended result for best guess.
#
# Revision 1.17 2005/07/15 20:25:36 customdesigned
# Use extended results processing for best_guess.
#
# Revision 1.16 2005/07/14 03:23:33 customdesigned
# Make SES package optional. Initial honeypot support.
#
# Revision 1.15 2005/07/06 04:05:40 customdesigned
# Initial SES integration.
#
# Revision 1.14 2005/07/02 23:27:31 customdesigned
# Don't match hostnames for internal connects.
#
# Revision 1.13 2005/07/01 16:30:24 customdesigned
# Always log trusted Received and Received-SPF headers.
#
# Revision 1.12 2005/06/20 22:35:35 customdesigned
# Setreply for rejectvirus.
#
# Revision 1.11 2005/06/17 02:07:20 customdesigned
# Release 0.8.1
#
# Revision 1.10 2005/06/16 18:35:51 customdesigned
# Ignore HeaderParseError decoding header
#
# Revision 1.9 2005/06/14 21:55:29 customdesigned
# Check internal_domains for outgoing mail.
#
# Revision 1.8 2005/06/06 18:24:59 customdesigned
# Properly log exceptions from pydspam
#
# Revision 1.7 2005/06/04 19:41:16 customdesigned
# Fix bugs from testing RPM
#
# Revision 1.6 2005/06/03 04:57:05 customdesigned
# Organize config reader by section. Create defang section.
#
# Revision 1.5 2005/06/02 15:00:17 customdesigned
# Configure banned extensions. Scan zipfile option with test case.
#
# Revision 1.4 2005/06/02 04:18:55 customdesigned
# Update copyright notices after reading article on /.
#
# Revision 1.3 2005/06/02 02:09:00 customdesigned
# Record timestamp in send_dsn.log
#
# Revision 1.2 2005/06/02 01:00:36 customdesigned
# Support configurable templates for DSNs.
NEWS
+ 3
− 0
View file @ 59bf86e7
Here is a history of user visible changes to Python milter.
0.8.7 Move spf module to pyspf
Prevent PTR cache poisoning
More lame bounce heuristics
0.8.6 Support CBV timeout
Support fail template, headers in templates
Create GOSSiP record only when connection will procede to DATA.
......
cid2spf.py deleted 100644 → 0
+ 0
− 153
View file @ 8f5513a5
#!/usr/bin/python2.3
# Convert a MS Caller-ID entry (XML) to a SPF entry
#
# (c) 2004 by Ernesto Baschny
# (c) 2004 Python version by Stuart Gathman
#
# Date: 2004-02-25
# Version: 1.0
#
# Usage:
# ./cid2spf.pl "<ep xmlns='http://ms.net/1'>...</ep>"
#
# Note that the 'include' directives will also have to be checked and
# "translated". Future versions of this script might be able to get a
# domain name as an argument and "crawl" the DNS for the necessary
# information.
#
# A complete reverse translation (SPF -> CID) might be impossible, since
# there are no way to handle:
# - PTR and EXISTS mechanism
# - MX mechanism with an different domain as argument
# - macros
#
# References:
# http://www.microsoft.com/mscorp/twc/privacy/spam_callerid.mspx
# http://spf.pobox.com/
#
# Known bugs:
# - Currently it won't handle the exclusions provided in the A and R
# tags (prefix '!'). They will show up "as-is" in the SPF record
# - I really haven't read the MS-CID specs in-depth, so there are probably
# other bugs too :)
#
# Ernesto Baschny <ernst@baschny.de>
#
import xml.sax
import spf
# -------------------------------------------------------------------------
class CIDParser(xml.sax.ContentHandler):
"Convert a MS Caller-ID entry (XML) to a SPF entry"
def __init__(self,q=None):
self.spf = []
self.action = '-all'
self.has_servers = None
self.spf_entry = None
if q:
self.spf_query = q
else:
self.spf_query = spf.query(i='127.0.0.1', s='localhost', h='unknown')
def startElement(self,tag,attr):
if tag == 'm':
if self.has_servers != None and not self.has_servers:
raise ValueError(
"Declared <noMailServers\> and later <m>, this CID entry is not valid."
)
self.has_servers = True
elif tag == 'noMailServers':
if self.has_servers:
raise ValueError(
"Declared <m> and later <noMailServers\>, this CID entry is not valid."
)
self.has_servers = False
elif tag == 'ep':
if attr.has_key('testing') and attr.getValue('testing') == 'true':
# A CID with 'testing' found:
# From the MS-specs:
# "Documents in which such attribute is present with a true
# value SHOULD be entirely ignored (one should act as if the
# document were absent)"
# From the SPF-specs:
# "Neutral (?): The SPF client MUST proceed as if a domain did
# not publish SPF data."
# So we set SPF action to "neutral":
self.action = '?all'
elif tag == 'mx':
# The empty MX-tag, same as SPF's MX-mechanism
self.spf.append('mx')
self.tag = tag
def characters(self,text):
tag = self.tag
# Remove starting and trailing spaces from text:
text = text.strip()
if tag == 'a' or tag == 'r':
# The A and R tags from MS-CID are both handled by the
# ipv4/6-mechanisms from SPF:
if text.find(':') < 0:
mechanism = 'ip4'
else:
mechanism = 'ip6'
self.spf.append(mechanism + ':' + text)
elif tag == 'indirect':
# MS-CID's indirect is "sort of" the include from SPF:
# Not really true, because the <indirect> tag from MS-CID also
# provides a fallback in case the included domain doesn't provide
# _ep-records: The inbound MX-servers of the included domains
# are added to the list of allowed outgoing mailservers for the
# domain that declared the _ep-record with the <indirect> tag.
# In SPF you would use the 'mx:domain' to handle this, but this
# wouldn't depend on referred domain having or not SPF-records.
cid_xml = self.cid_txt(text)
if cid_xml:
p = CIDParser()
xml.sax.parseString(cid_xml,p)
if p.has_servers != False:
self.spf += p.spf
else:
self.spf.append('mx:' + text)
def cid_txt(self,domain):
q = self.spf_query
domain='_ep.' + domain
a = q.dns_txt(domain)
if not a: return None
if a[0].lower().startswith('<ep ') and a[-1].lower().endswith('</ep>'):
return ''.join(a)
return None
def endElement(self,tag):
if tag == 'ep':
# This is the end... assemble what we've got
spf_entry = ['v=spf1']
if self.has_servers != False:
spf_entry += self.spf
spf_entry.append(self.action)
self.spf_entry = ' '.join(spf_entry)
def spf_txt(self,cid_xml):
if not cid_xml.startswith('<'):
cid_xml = self.cid_txt(cid_xml)
if not cid_xml: return None
# Parse the beast. Any XML-problem will be reported by xlm.sax
self.spf_entry = None
xml.sax.parseString(cid_xml,self)
return self.spf_entry
if __name__ == '__main__':
import sys
if len(sys.argv) < 2:
print >>sys.stderr, \
"""Usage: %s "<ep xmlns='http://ms.net/1'>...</ep>" """ % sys.argv[0]
sys.exit(1)
cid_xml = sys.argv[1]
p = CIDParser()
print p.spf_txt(cid_xml)
milter.spec
+ 18
− 16
View file @ 59bf86e7
%define name milter
%define version 0.8.6
%define release 2.RH7
%define version 0.8.7
%define release 1
# what version of RH are we building for?
%define redhat9 0
%define redhat7 1
%define redhat6 0
%define redhat7 0
# Options for Redhat version 6.x:
# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "rh6 1"
%{?rh6:%define redhat7 0}
%{?rh6:%define redhat6 1}
# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "rh7 1"
%{?rh7:%define redhat7 1}
# some systems dont have initrddir defined
%{?_initrddir:%define _initrddir /etc/rc.d/init.d}
%if %{redhat9}
%define sysvinit milter.rc
%else # Redhat 7.x and earlier (multiple ps lines per thread)
%if %{redhat7} # Redhat 7.x and earlier (multiple ps lines per thread)
%define sysvinit milter.rc7
%else
%define sysvinit milter.rc
%endif
# RH9, other systems (single ps line per process)
%ifos Linux
......@@ -43,22 +40,23 @@ Requires: %{python} >= 2.4, sendmail >= 8.13
%ifos Linux
Requires: chkconfig
%endif
BuildRequires: %{python}-devel , sendmail-devel >= 8.13
BuildRequires: %{python}-devel >= 2.4, sendmail-devel >= 8.13
%description
This is a python extension module to enable python scripts to
attach to sendmail's libmilter functionality. Additional python
modules provide for navigating and modifying MIME parts.
modules provide for navigating and modifying MIME parts, sending
DSNs, and doing CBV.
%prep
%setup
#patch -p0 -b .bms
%build
%if %{redhat9}
LDFLAGS="-g"
%else
%if %{redhat7}
LDFLAGS="-s"
%else # Redhat builds debug packages after 7.3
LDFLAGS="-g"
%endif
env CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" %{python} setup.py build
......@@ -176,6 +174,10 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
/usr/share/sendmail-cf/hack/rhsbl.m4
%changelog
* Sat Nov 04 2006 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.7-1
- Prevent PTR cache poisoning
- More lame bounce heuristics
- SPF moved to pyspf RPM
* Tue May 23 2006 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com> 0.8.6-2
- Support CBV timeout
- Support fail template, headers in templates
......
quarantine.txt
+ 13
− 0
View file @ 59bf86e7
......@@ -22,6 +22,19 @@ their quarantined mail and may notice your message. If your message is
important, please contact them via other means. You may also try sending
them a simple plain text message.
If you never sent the above message, then your domain, %(sender_domain)s,
was forged - i.e. used without your knowlege or authorization by
someone attempting to steal your mail identity. This is a very
serious problem, and you need to provide authentication for your
SMTP (email) servers to prevent criminals from forging your
domain. The simplest step is usually to publish an SPF record
with your Sender Policy.
For more information, see: http://www.openspf.org
Your mail admin needs to publish a strict SPF record so that I can reject
those forgeries instead of bugging you with them.
If you need further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Kind regards,
......
setup.py
+ 3
− 3
View file @ 59bf86e7
......@@ -15,13 +15,13 @@ if sys.version < '2.2.3':
DistributionMetadata.download_url = None
# NOTE: importing Milter to obtain version fails when milter.so not built
setup(name = "milter", version = '0.8.6',
setup(name = "milter", version = '0.8.7',
description="Python interface to sendmail milter API",
long_description="""\
This is a python extension module to enable python scripts to
attach to sendmail's libmilter functionality. Additional python
modules provide for navigating and modifying MIME parts, and
querying SPF records.
sending DSNs or doing CBVs.
""",
author="Jim Niemira",
author_email="urmane@urmane.org",
......@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ querying SPF records.
maintainer_email="stuart@bmsi.com",
license="GPL",
url="http://www.bmsi.com/python/milter.html",
py_modules=["mime","spf"],
py_modules=["mime"],
packages = ['Milter'],
ext_modules=[
Extension("milter", ["miltermodule.c"],
......
softfail.txt
+ 1
− 1
View file @ 59bf86e7
......@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Subject: %(subject)s
Received-SPF: %(spf_result)s
Your sender policy indicated that the above email was likely forged and that
feedback was desired. If you are sending from a foreign ISP,
feedback was desired for debugging. If you are sending from a foreign ISP,
then you may need to follow your home ISPs instructions for configuring
your outgoing mail server.
......
spf.py deleted 100755 → 0
+ 0
− 1514
View file @ 8f5513a5
#!/usr/bin/env python
"""SPF (Sender Policy Framework) implementation.
Copyright (c) 2003, Terence Way
Portions Copyright (c) 2004,2005,2006 Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
Portions Copyright (c) 2005,2006 Scott Kitterman <scott@kitterman.com>
This module is free software, and you may redistribute it and/or modify
it under the same terms as Python itself, so long as this copyright message
and disclaimer are retained in their original form.
IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE TO ANY PARTY FOR DIRECT, INDIRECT,
SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THE USE OF
THIS CODE, EVEN IF THE AUTHOR HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
DAMAGE.
THE AUTHOR SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE CODE PROVIDED HEREUNDER IS ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
AND THERE IS NO OBLIGATION WHATSOEVER TO PROVIDE MAINTENANCE,
SUPPORT, UPDATES, ENHANCEMENTS, OR MODIFICATIONS.
For more information about SPF, a tool against email forgery, see
http://www.openspf.org/
For news, bugfixes, etc. visit the home page for this implementation at
http://www.wayforward.net/spf/
http://sourceforge.net/projects/pymilter/
"""
# Changes:
# 9-dec-2003, v1.1, Meng Weng Wong added PTR code, THANK YOU
# 11-dec-2003, v1.2, ttw added macro expansion, exp=, and redirect=
# 13-dec-2003, v1.3, ttw added %{o} original domain macro,
# print spf result on command line, support default=,
# support localhost, follow DNS CNAMEs, cache DNS results
# during query, support Python 2.2 for Mac OS X
# 16-dec-2003, v1.4, ttw fixed include handling (include is a mechanism,
# complete with status results, so -include: should work.
# Expand macros AFTER looking for status characters ?-+
# so altavista.com SPF records work.
# 17-dec-2003, v1.5, ttw use socket.inet_aton() instead of DNS.addr2bin, so
# n, n.n, and n.n.n forms for IPv4 addresses work, and to
# ditch the annoying Python 2.4 FutureWarning
# 18-dec-2003, v1.6, Failures on Intel hardware: endianness. Use ! on
# struct.pack(), struct.unpack().
#
# Development taken over by Stuart Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>.
#
# $Log$
# Revision 1.107 2006/11/04 21:58:12 customdesigned
# Prevent cache poisoning by bogus additional RRs in PTR DNS response.
#
# See spf_changelog.txt for earlier changes.
__author__ = "Terence Way"
__email__ = "terry@wayforward.net"
__version__ = "1.7: July 22, 2005"
MODULE = 'spf'
USAGE = """To check an incoming mail request:
% python spf.py {ip} {sender} {helo}
% python spf.py 69.55.226.139 tway@optsw.com mx1.wayforward.net
To test an SPF record:
% python spf.py "v=spf1..." {ip} {sender} {helo}
% python spf.py "v=spf1 +mx +ip4:10.0.0.1 -all" 10.0.0.1 tway@foo.com a
To fetch an SPF record:
% python spf.py {domain}
% python spf.py wayforward.net
To test this script (and to output this usage message):
% python spf.py
"""
import re
import socket # for inet_ntoa() and inet_aton()
import struct # for pack() and unpack()
import time # for time()
import urllib # for quote()
import DNS # http://pydns.sourceforge.net
if not hasattr(DNS.Type, 'SPF'):
# patch in type99 support
DNS.Type.SPF = 99
DNS.Type.typemap[99] = 'SPF'
DNS.Lib.RRunpacker.getSPFdata = DNS.Lib.RRunpacker.getTXTdata
def DNSLookup(name, qtype, strict=True):
try:
req = DNS.DnsRequest(name, qtype=qtype)
resp = req.req()
#resp.show()
# key k: ('wayforward.net', 'A'), value v
# FIXME: pydns returns AAAA RR as 16 byte binary string, but
# A RR as dotted quad. For consistency, this driver should
# return both as binary string.
return [((a['name'], a['typename']), a['data']) for a in resp.answers]
except IOError, x:
raise TempError, 'DNS ' + str(x)
except DNS.DNSError, x:
raise TempError, 'DNS ' + str(x)
RE_SPF = re.compile(r'^v=spf1$|^v=spf1 ',re.IGNORECASE)
# Regular expression to look for modifiers
RE_MODIFIER = re.compile(r'^([a-z][a-z0-9_\-\.]*)=', re.IGNORECASE)
# Regular expression to find macro expansions
PAT_CHAR = r'%(%|_|-|(\{[^\}]*\}))'
RE_CHAR = re.compile(PAT_CHAR)
# Regular expression to break up a macro expansion
RE_ARGS = re.compile(r'([0-9]*)(r?)([^0-9a-zA-Z]*)')
RE_DUAL_CIDR = re.compile(r'//(0|[1-9]\d*)$')
RE_CIDR = re.compile(r'/(0|[1-9]\d*)$')
PAT_IP4 = r'\.'.join([r'(?:\d|[1-9]\d|1\d\d|2[0-4]\d|25[0-5])']*4)
RE_IP4 = re.compile(PAT_IP4+'$')
RE_TOPLAB = re.compile(
r'\.(?:[0-9a-z]*[a-z][0-9a-z]*|[0-9a-z]+-[0-9a-z-]*[0-9a-z])\.?$|%s'
% PAT_CHAR, re.IGNORECASE)
RE_IP6 = re.compile( '(?:%(hex4)s:){6}%(ls32)s$'
'|::(?:%(hex4)s:){5}%(ls32)s$'
'|(?:%(hex4)s)?::(?:%(hex4)s:){4}%(ls32)s$'
'|(?:(?:%(hex4)s:){0,1}%(hex4)s)?::(?:%(hex4)s:){3}%(ls32)s$'
'|(?:(?:%(hex4)s:){0,2}%(hex4)s)?::(?:%(hex4)s:){2}%(ls32)s$'
'|(?:(?:%(hex4)s:){0,3}%(hex4)s)?::%(hex4)s:%(ls32)s$'
'|(?:(?:%(hex4)s:){0,4}%(hex4)s)?::%(ls32)s$'
'|(?:(?:%(hex4)s:){0,5}%(hex4)s)?::%(hex4)s$'
'|(?:(?:%(hex4)s:){0,6}%(hex4)s)?::$'
% {
'ls32': r'(?:[0-9a-f]{1,4}:[0-9a-f]{1,4}|%s)'%PAT_IP4,
'hex4': r'[0-9a-f]{1,4}'
}, re.IGNORECASE)
# Local parts and senders have their delimiters replaced with '.' during
# macro expansion
#
JOINERS = {'l': '.', 's': '.'}
RESULTS = {'+': 'pass', '-': 'fail', '?': 'neutral', '~': 'softfail',
'pass': 'pass', 'fail': 'fail', 'permerror': 'permerror',
'error': 'error', 'neutral': 'neutral', 'softfail': 'softfail',
'none': 'none', 'local': 'local', 'trusted': 'trusted',
'ambiguous': 'ambiguous'}
EXPLANATIONS = {'pass': 'sender SPF authorized',
'fail': 'SPF fail - not authorized',
'permerror': 'permanent error in processing',
'temperror': 'temporary DNS error in processing',
'softfail': 'domain owner discourages use of this host',
'neutral': 'access neither permitted nor denied',
'none': '',
#Note: The following are not formally SPF results
'local': 'No SPF result due to local policy',
'trusted': 'No SPF check - trusted-forwarder.org',
#Ambiguous only used in harsh mode for SPF validation
'ambiguous': 'No error, but results may vary'
}
# support pre 2.2.1....
try:
bool, True, False = bool, True, False
except NameError:
False, True = 0, 1
def bool(x): return not not x
# ...pre 2.2.1
DELEGATE = None
# standard default SPF record for best_guess
DEFAULT_SPF = 'v=spf1 a/24 mx/24 ptr'
#Whitelisted forwarders here. Additional locally trusted forwarders can be
#added to this record.
TRUSTED_FORWARDERS = 'v=spf1 ?include:spf.trusted-forwarder.org -all'
# maximum DNS lookups allowed
MAX_LOOKUP = 10 #RFC 4408 Para 10.1
MAX_MX = 10 #RFC 4408 Para 10.1
MAX_PTR = 10 #RFC 4408 Para 10.1
MAX_CNAME = 10 # analogous interpretation to MAX_PTR
MAX_RECURSION = 20
ALL_MECHANISMS = ('a', 'mx', 'ptr', 'exists', 'include', 'ip4', 'ip6', 'all')
COMMON_MISTAKES = {
'prt': 'ptr', 'ip': 'ip4', 'ipv4': 'ip4', 'ipv6': 'ip6', 'all.': 'all'
}
#If harsh processing, for the validator, is invoked, warn if results
#likely deviate from the publishers intention.
class AmbiguityWarning(Exception):
"SPF Warning - ambiguous results"
def __init__(self, msg, mech=None, ext=None):
Exception.__init__(self, msg, mech)
self.msg = msg
self.mech = mech
self.ext = ext
def __str__(self):
if self.mech:
return '%s: %s' %(self.msg, self.mech)
return self.msg
class TempError(Exception):
"Temporary SPF error"
def __init__(self, msg, mech=None, ext=None):
Exception.__init__(self, msg, mech)
self.msg = msg
self.mech = mech
self.ext = ext
def __str__(self):
if self.mech:
return '%s: %s '%(self.msg, self.mech)
return self.msg
class PermError(Exception):
"Permanent SPF error"
def __init__(self, msg, mech=None, ext=None):
Exception.__init__(self, msg, mech)
self.msg = msg
self.mech = mech
self.ext = ext
def __str__(self):
if self.mech:
return '%s: %s'%(self.msg, self.mech)
return self.msg
def check2(i, s, h, local=None, receiver=None):
"""Test an incoming MAIL FROM:<s>, from a client with ip address i.
h is the HELO/EHLO domain name. This is the RFC4408 compliant pySPF2.0
interface. The interface returns an SPF result and explanation only.
SMTP response codes are not returned since RFC 4408 does not specify
receiver policy. Applications updated for RFC 4408 should use this
interface.
Returns (result, explanation) where result in
['pass', 'permerror', 'fail', 'temperror', 'softfail', 'none', 'neutral' ].
Example:
#>>> check2(i='61.51.192.42', s='liukebing@bcc.com', h='bmsi.com')
"""
res,_,exp = query(i=i, s=s, h=h, local=local, receiver=receiver).check()
return res,exp
def check(i, s, h, local=None, receiver=None):
"""Test an incoming MAIL FROM:<s>, from a client with ip address i.
h is the HELO/EHLO domain name. This is the pre-RFC SPF Classic interface.
Applications written for pySPF 1.6/1.7 can use this interface to allow
pySPF2 to be a drop in replacement for older versions. With the exception
of result codes, performance in RFC 4408 compliant.
Returns (result, code, explanation) where result in
['pass', 'unknown', 'fail', 'error', 'softfail', 'none', 'neutral' ].
Example:
#>>> check(i='61.51.192.42', s='liukebing@bcc.com', h='bmsi.com')
"""
res,code,exp = query(i=i, s=s, h=h, local=local, receiver=receiver).check()
if res == 'permerror':
res = 'unknown'
elif res == 'tempfail':
res =='error'
return res, code, exp
class query(object):
"""A query object keeps the relevant information about a single SPF
query:
i: ip address of SMTP client in dotted notation
s: sender declared in MAIL FROM:<>
l: local part of sender s
d: current domain, initially domain part of sender s
h: EHLO/HELO domain
v: 'in-addr' for IPv4 clients and 'ip6' for IPv6 clients
t: current timestamp
p: SMTP client domain name
o: domain part of sender s
r: receiver
c: pretty ip address (different from i for IPv6)
This is also, by design, the same variables used in SPF macro
expansion.
Also keeps cache: DNS cache.
"""
def __init__(self, i, s, h, local=None, receiver=None, strict=True):
self.s, self.h = s, h
if not s and h:
self.s = 'postmaster@' + h
self.l, self.o = split_email(s, h)
self.t = str(int(time.time()))
self.d = self.o
self.p = None # lazy evaluation
if receiver:
self.r = receiver
else:
self.r = 'unknown'
# Since the cache does not track Time To Live, it is created
# fresh for each query. It is important for efficiently using
# multiple results provided in DNS answers.
self.cache = {}
self.defexps = dict(EXPLANATIONS)
self.exps = dict(EXPLANATIONS)
self.libspf_local = local # local policy
self.lookups = 0
# strict can be False, True, or 2 (numeric) for harsh
self.strict = strict
if i:
self.set_ip(i)
def set_ip(self, i):
"Set connect ip, and ip6 or ip4 mode."
if RE_IP4.match(i):
self.ip = addr2bin(i)
ip6 = False
else:
self.ip = bin2long6(inet_pton(i))
if (self.ip >> 32) == 0xFFFF: # IP4 mapped address
self.ip = self.ip & 0xFFFFFFFFL
ip6 = False
else:
ip6 = True
# NOTE: self.A is not lowercase, so isn't a macro. See query.expand()
if ip6:
self.c = inet_ntop(
struct.pack("!QQ", self.ip>>64, self.ip&0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFL))
self.i = '.'.join(list('%032X'%self.ip))
self.A = 'AAAA'
self.v = 'ip6'
self.cidrmax = 128
else:
self.c = socket.inet_ntoa(struct.pack("!L", self.ip))
self.i = self.c
self.A = 'A'
self.v = 'in-addr'
self.cidrmax = 32
def set_default_explanation(self, exp):
exps = self.exps
defexps = self.defexps
for i in 'softfail', 'fail', 'permerror':
exps[i] = exp
defexps[i] = exp
def set_explanation(self, exp):
exps = self.exps
for i in 'softfail', 'fail', 'permerror':
exps[i] = exp
# Compute p macro only if needed
def getp(self):
if not self.p:
p = self.validated_ptrs()
if not p:
self.p = "unknown"
elif self.d in p:
self.p = self.d
else:
sfx = '.' + self.d
for d in p:
if d.endswith(sfx):
self.p = d
break
else:
self.p = p[0]
return self.p
def best_guess(self, spf=DEFAULT_SPF):
"""Return a best guess based on a default SPF record"""
return self.check(spf)
def check(self, spf=None):
"""
Returns (result, mta-status-code, explanation) where result
in ['fail', 'softfail', 'neutral' 'permerror', 'pass', 'temperror', 'none']
Examples:
>>> q = query(s='strong-bad@email.example.com',
... h='mx.example.org', i='192.0.2.3')
>>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ?all')
('neutral', 250, 'access neither permitted nor denied')
>>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 redirect=controlledmail.com exp=_exp.controlledmail.com')
('fail', 550, 'SPF fail - not authorized')
>>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ip4:192.0.0.0/8 ?all moo')
('permerror', 550, 'SPF Permanent Error: Unknown mechanism found: moo')
>>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 =a ?all moo')
('permerror', 550, 'SPF Permanent Error: Unknown qualifier, RFC 4408 para 4.6.1, found in: =a')
>>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ip4:192.0.0.0/8 ~all')
('pass', 250, 'sender SPF authorized')
>>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ip4:192.0.0.0/8 -all moo=')
('pass', 250, 'sender SPF authorized')
>>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ip4:192.0.0.0/8 -all match.sub-domains_9=yes')
('pass', 250, 'sender SPF authorized')
>>> q.strict = False
>>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ip4:192.0.0.0/8 -all moo')
('permerror', 550, 'SPF Permanent Error: Unknown mechanism found: moo')
>>> q.perm_error.ext
('pass', 250, 'sender SPF authorized')
>>> q.strict = True
>>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ip4:192.1.0.0/16 moo -all')
('permerror', 550, 'SPF Permanent Error: Unknown mechanism found: moo')
>>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ip4:192.1.0.0/16 ~all')
('softfail', 250, 'domain owner discourages use of this host')
>>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 -ip4:192.1.0.0/6 ~all')
('fail', 550, 'SPF fail - not authorized')
# Assumes DNS available
>>> q.check()
('none', 250, '')
>>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ip4:1.2.3.4 -a:example.net -all')
('fail', 550, 'SPF fail - not authorized')
>>> q.libspf_local='ip4:192.0.2.3 a:example.org'
>>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ip4:1.2.3.4 -a:example.net -all')
('pass', 250, 'sender SPF authorized')
>>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ip4:1.2.3.4 -all exp=_exp.controlledmail.com')
('fail', 550, 'Controlledmail.com does not send mail from itself.')
>>> q.check(spf='v=spf1 ip4:1.2.3.4 ?all exp=_exp.controlledmail.com')
('neutral', 250, 'access neither permitted nor denied')
"""
self.mech = [] # unknown mechanisms
# If not strict, certain PermErrors (mispelled
# mechanisms, strict processing limits exceeded)
# will continue processing. However, the exception
# that strict processing would raise is saved here
self.perm_error = None
try:
self.lookups = 0
if not spf:
spf = self.dns_spf(self.d)
if self.libspf_local and spf:
spf = insert_libspf_local_policy(
spf, self.libspf_local)
rc = self.check1(spf, self.d, 0)
if self.perm_error:
# lax processing encountered a permerror, but continued
self.perm_error.ext = rc
raise self.perm_error
return rc
except TempError, x:
self.prob = x.msg
if x.mech:
self.mech.append(x.mech)
return ('temperror', 451, 'SPF Temporary Error: ' + str(x))
except PermError, x:
if not self.perm_error:
self.perm_error = x
self.prob = x.msg
if x.mech:
self.mech.append(x.mech)
# Pre-Lentczner draft treats this as an unknown result
# and equivalent to no SPF record.
return ('permerror', 550, 'SPF Permanent Error: ' + str(x))
def check1(self, spf, domain, recursion):
# spf rfc: 3.7 Processing Limits
#
if recursion > MAX_RECURSION:
# This should never happen in strict mode
# because of the other limits we check,
# so if it does, there is something wrong with
# our code. It is not a PermError because there is not
# necessarily anything wrong with the SPF record.
if self.strict:
raise AssertionError('Too many levels of recursion')
# As an extended result, however, it should be
# a PermError.
raise PermError('Too many levels of recursion')
try:
try:
tmp, self.d = self.d, domain
return self.check0(spf, recursion)
finally:
self.d = tmp
except AmbiguityWarning,x:
self.prob = x.msg
if x.mech:
self.mech.append(x.mech)
return ('ambiguous', 000, 'SPF Ambiguity Warning: %s' % x)
def note_error(self, *msg):
if self.strict:
raise PermError(*msg)
# if lax mode, note error and continue
if not self.perm_error:
try:
raise PermError(*msg)
except PermError, x:
# FIXME: keep a list of errors for even friendlier diagnostics.
self.perm_error = x
return self.perm_error
def validate_mechanism(self, mech):
"""Parse and validate a mechanism.
Returns mech,m,arg,cidrlength,result
Examples:
>>> q = query(s='strong-bad@email.example.com.',
... h='mx.example.org', i='192.0.2.3')
>>> q.validate_mechanism('A')
('A', 'a', 'email.example.com', 32, 'pass')
>>> q = query(s='strong-bad@email.example.com',
... h='mx.example.org', i='192.0.2.3')
>>> q.validate_mechanism('A')
('A', 'a', 'email.example.com', 32, 'pass')
>>> q.validate_mechanism('?mx:%{d}/27')
('?mx:%{d}/27', 'mx', 'email.example.com', 27, 'neutral')
>>> try: q.validate_mechanism('ip4:1.2.3.4/247')
... except PermError,x: print x
Invalid IP4 CIDR length: ip4:1.2.3.4/247
>>> try: q.validate_mechanism('ip4:1.2.3.4/33')
... except PermError,x: print x
Invalid IP4 CIDR length: ip4:1.2.3.4/33
>>> try: q.validate_mechanism('a:example.com:8080')
... except PermError,x: print x
Invalid domain found (use FQDN): example.com:8080
>>> try: q.validate_mechanism('ip4:1.2.3.444/24')
... except PermError,x: print x
Invalid IP4 address: ip4:1.2.3.444/24
>>> try: q.validate_mechanism('ip4:1.2.03.4/24')
... except PermError,x: print x
Invalid IP4 address: ip4:1.2.03.4/24
>>> try: q.validate_mechanism('-all:3030')
... except PermError,x: print x
Invalid all mechanism format - only qualifier allowed with all: -all:3030
>>> q.validate_mechanism('-mx:%%%_/.Clara.de/27')
('-mx:%%%_/.Clara.de/27', 'mx', '% /.Clara.de', 27, 'fail')
>>> q.validate_mechanism('~exists:%{i}.%{s1}.100/86400.rate.%{d}')
('~exists:%{i}.%{s1}.100/86400.rate.%{d}', 'exists', '192.0.2.3.com.100/86400.rate.email.example.com', 32, 'softfail')
>>> q.validate_mechanism('a:mail.example.com.')
('a:mail.example.com.', 'a', 'mail.example.com', 32, 'pass')
"""
# a mechanism
m, arg, cidrlength, cidr6length = parse_mechanism(mech, self.d)
# map '?' '+' or '-' to 'neutral' 'pass' or 'fail'
if m:
result = RESULTS.get(m[0])
if result:
# eat '?' '+' or '-'
m = m[1:]
else:
# default pass
result = 'pass'
if m in COMMON_MISTAKES:
self.note_error('Unknown mechanism found', mech)
m = COMMON_MISTAKES[m]
if m == 'a' and RE_IP4.match(arg):
x = self.note_error(
'Use the ip4 mechanism for ip4 addresses', mech)
m = 'ip4'
# validate cidr and dual-cidr
if m in ('a', 'mx'):
if cidrlength is None:
cidrlength = 32;
elif cidrlength > 32:
raise PermError('Invalid IP4 CIDR length', mech)
if cidr6length is None:
cidr6length = 128
elif cidr6length > 128:
raise PermError('Invalid IP6 CIDR length', mech)
if self.v == 'ip6':
cidrlength = cidr6length
elif m == 'ip4':
if cidr6length is not None:
raise PermError('Dual CIDR not allowed', mech)
if cidrlength is None:
cidrlength = 32;
elif cidrlength > 32:
raise PermError('Invalid IP4 CIDR length', mech)
if not RE_IP4.match(arg):
raise PermError('Invalid IP4 address', mech)
elif m == 'ip6':
if cidr6length is not None:
raise PermError('Dual CIDR not allowed', mech)
if cidrlength is None:
cidrlength = 128
elif cidrlength > 128:
raise PermError('Invalid IP6 CIDR length', mech)
if not RE_IP6.match(arg):
raise PermError('Invalid IP6 address', mech)
else:
if cidrlength is not None or cidr6length is not None:
raise PermError('CIDR not allowed', mech)
cidrlength = self.cidrmax
# validate domain-spec
if m in ('a', 'mx', 'ptr', 'exists', 'include'):
# any trailing dot was removed by expand()
if RE_TOPLAB.split(arg)[-1]:
raise PermError('Invalid domain found (use FQDN)', arg)
arg = self.expand(arg)
if m == 'include':
if arg == self.d:
if mech != 'include':
raise PermError('include has trivial recursion', mech)
raise PermError('include mechanism missing domain', mech)
return mech, m, arg, cidrlength, result
# validate 'all' mechanism per RFC 4408 ABNF
if m == 'all' and mech.count(':'):
# print '|'+ arg + '|', mech, self.d,
self.note_error(
'Invalid all mechanism format - only qualifier allowed with all'
, mech)
if m in ALL_MECHANISMS:
return mech, m, arg, cidrlength, result
if m[1:] in ALL_MECHANISMS:
x = self.note_error(
'Unknown qualifier, RFC 4408 para 4.6.1, found in', mech)
else:
x = self.note_error('Unknown mechanism found', mech)
return mech, m, arg, cidrlength, x
def check0(self, spf, recursion):
"""Test this query information against SPF text.
Returns (result, mta-status-code, explanation) where
result in ['fail', 'unknown', 'pass', 'none']
"""
if not spf:
return ('none', 250, EXPLANATIONS['none'])
# split string by whitespace, drop the 'v=spf1'
spf = spf.split()
# Catch case where SPF record has no spaces.
# Can never happen with conforming dns_spf(), however
# in the future we might want to give warnings
# for common mistakes like IN TXT "v=spf1" "mx" "-all"
# in relaxed mode.
if spf[0].lower() != 'v=spf1':
assert strict > 1
raise AmbiguityWarning('Invalid SPF record in', self.d)
spf = spf[1:]
# copy of explanations to be modified by exp=
exps = self.exps
redirect = None
# no mechanisms at all cause unknown result, unless
# overridden with 'default=' modifier
#
default = 'neutral'
mechs = []
# Look for modifiers
#
for mech in spf:
m = RE_MODIFIER.split(mech)[1:]
if len(m) != 2:
mechs.append(self.validate_mechanism(mech))
continue
if m[0] == 'exp':
# always fetch explanation to check permerrors
exp = self.get_explanation(m[1])
if not recursion:
# only set explanation in base recursion level
self.set_explanation(exp)
elif m[0] == 'redirect':
self.check_lookups()
redirect = self.expand(m[1])
elif m[0] == 'default':
arg = self.expand(m[1])
# default=- is the same as default=fail
default = RESULTS.get(arg, default)
else:
# spf rfc: 3.6 Unrecognized Mechanisms and Modifiers
self.expand(m[1]) # syntax error on invalid macro
# Evaluate mechanisms
#
for mech, m, arg, cidrlength, result in mechs:
if m == 'include':
self.check_lookups()
res, code, txt = self.check1(self.dns_spf(arg),
arg, recursion + 1)
if res == 'pass':
break
if res == 'none':
self.note_error(
'No valid SPF record for included domain: %s' %arg,
mech)
res = 'neutral'
continue
elif m == 'all':
break
elif m == 'exists':
self.check_lookups()
try:
if len(self.dns_a(arg,'A')) > 0:
break
except AmbiguityWarning:
# Exists wants no response sometimes so don't raise
# the warning.
pass
elif m == 'a':
self.check_lookups()
if self.cidrmatch(self.dns_a(arg,self.A), cidrlength):
break
elif m == 'mx':
self.check_lookups()
if self.cidrmatch(self.dns_mx(arg), cidrlength):
break
elif m == 'ip4':
if self.v == 'in-addr': # match own connection type only
try:
if self.cidrmatch([arg], cidrlength): break
except socket.error:
raise PermError('syntax error', mech)
elif m == 'ip6':
if self.v == 'ip6': # match own connection type only
try:
arg = inet_pton(arg)
if self.cidrmatch([arg], cidrlength): break
except socket.error:
raise PermError('syntax error', mech)
elif m == 'ptr':
self.check_lookups()
if domainmatch(self.validated_ptrs(), arg):
break
else:
# no matches
if redirect:
#Catch redirect to a non-existant SPF record.
redirect_record = self.dns_spf(redirect)
if not redirect_record:
raise PermError('redirect domain has no SPF record',
redirect)
self.exps = dict(self.defexps)
return self.check1(redirect_record, redirect, recursion)
else:
result = default
if result == 'fail':
return (result, 550, exps[result])
else:
return (result, 250, exps[result])
def check_lookups(self):
self.lookups = self.lookups + 1
if self.lookups > MAX_LOOKUP*4:
raise PermError('More than %d DNS lookups'%MAX_LOOKUP*4)
if self.lookups > MAX_LOOKUP:
self.note_error('Too many DNS lookups')
def get_explanation(self, spec):
"""Expand an explanation."""
if spec:
txt = ''.join(self.dns_txt(self.expand(spec)))
return self.expand(txt, stripdot=False)
else:
return 'explanation : Required option is missing'
def expand(self, str, stripdot=True): # macros='slodipvh'
"""Do SPF RFC macro expansion.
Examples:
>>> q = query(s='strong-bad@email.example.com',
... h='mx.example.org', i='192.0.2.3')
>>> q.p = 'mx.example.org'
>>> q.r = 'example.net'
>>> q.expand('%{d}')
'email.example.com'
>>> q.expand('%{d4}')
'email.example.com'
>>> q.expand('%{d3}')
'email.example.com'
>>> q.expand('%{d2}')
'example.com'
>>> q.expand('%{d1}')
'com'
>>> q.expand('%{p}')
'mx.example.org'
>>> q.expand('%{p2}')
'example.org'
>>> q.expand('%{dr}')
'com.example.email'
>>> q.expand('%{d2r}')
'example.email'
>>> q.expand('%{l}')
'strong-bad'
>>> q.expand('%{l-}')
'strong.bad'
>>> q.expand('%{lr}')
'strong-bad'
>>> q.expand('%{lr-}')
'bad.strong'
>>> q.expand('%{l1r-}')
'strong'
>>> q.expand('%{c}',stripdot=False)
'192.0.2.3'
>>> q.expand('%{r}',stripdot=False)
'example.net'
>>> q.expand('%{ir}.%{v}._spf.%{d2}')
'3.2.0.192.in-addr._spf.example.com'
>>> q.expand('%{lr-}.lp._spf.%{d2}')
'bad.strong.lp._spf.example.com'
>>> q.expand('%{lr-}.lp.%{ir}.%{v}._spf.%{d2}')
'bad.strong.lp.3.2.0.192.in-addr._spf.example.com'
>>> q.expand('%{ir}.%{v}.%{l1r-}.lp._spf.%{d2}')
'3.2.0.192.in-addr.strong.lp._spf.example.com'
>>> try: q.expand('%(ir).%{v}.%{l1r-}.lp._spf.%{d2}')
... except PermError,x: print x
invalid-macro-char : %(ir)
>>> q.expand('%{p2}.trusted-domains.example.net')
'example.org.trusted-domains.example.net'
>>> q.expand('%{p2}.trusted-domains.example.net.')
'example.org.trusted-domains.example.net'
>>> q = query(s='@email.example.com',
... h='mx.example.org', i='192.0.2.3')
>>> q.p = 'mx.example.org'
>>> q.expand('%{l}')
'postmaster'
"""
macro_delimiters = ['{', '%', '-', '_']
end = 0
result = ''
macro_count = str.count('%')
if macro_count != 0:
labels = str.split('.')
for label in labels:
is_macro = False
if len(label) > 1:
if label[0] == '%':
for delimit in macro_delimiters:
if label[1] == delimit:
is_macro = True
if not is_macro:
raise PermError ('invalid-macro-char ', label)
break
for i in RE_CHAR.finditer(str):
result += str[end:i.start()]
macro = str[i.start():i.end()]
if macro == '%%':
result += '%'
elif macro == '%_':
result += ' '
elif macro == '%-':
result += '%20'
else:
letter = macro[2].lower()
# print letter
if letter == 'p':
self.getp()
elif letter in 'crt' and stripdot:
raise PermError(
'c,r,t macros allowed in exp= text only', macro)
expansion = getattr(self, letter, self)
if expansion:
if expansion == self:
raise PermError('Unknown Macro Encountered', macro)
e = expand_one(expansion, macro[3:-1], JOINERS.get(letter))
if letter != macro[2]:
e = urllib.quote(e)
result += e
end = i.end()
result += str[end:]
if stripdot and result.endswith('.'):
result = result[:-1]
if result.count('.') != 0:
if len(result) > 253:
result = result[(result.index('.')+1):]
return result
def dns_spf(self, domain):
"""Get the SPF record recorded in DNS for a specific domain
name. Returns None if not found, or if more than one record
is found.
"""
# Per RFC 4.3/1, check for malformed domain. This produces
# no results as a special case.
for label in domain.split('.'):
if not label or len(label) > 63:
return None
# for performance, check for most common case of TXT first
a = [t for t in self.dns_txt(domain) if RE_SPF.match(t)]
if len(a) > 1:
raise PermError('Two or more type TXT spf records found.')
if len(a) == 1 and self.strict < 2:
return a[0]
# check official SPF type first when it becomes more popular
try:
b = [t for t in self.dns_99(domain) if RE_SPF.match(t)]
except TempError,x:
# some braindead DNS servers hang on type 99 query
if self.strict > 1: raise TempError(x)
b = []
if len(b) > 1:
raise PermError('Two or more type SPF spf records found.')
if len(b) == 1:
if self.strict > 1 and len(a) == 1 and a[0] != b[0]:
#Changed from permerror to warning based on RFC 4408 Auth 48 change
raise AmbiguityWarning(
'v=spf1 records of both type TXT and SPF (type 99) present, but not identical')
return b[0]
if len(a) == 1:
return a[0] # return TXT if SPF wasn't found
if DELEGATE: # use local record if neither found
a = [t
for t in self.dns_txt(domain+'._spf.'+DELEGATE)
if RE_SPF.match(t)
]
if len(a) == 1: return a[0]
return None
def dns_txt(self, domainname):
"Get a list of TXT records for a domain name."
if domainname:
return [''.join(a) for a in self.dns(domainname, 'TXT')]
return []
def dns_99(self, domainname):
"Get a list of type SPF=99 records for a domain name."
if domainname:
return [''.join(a) for a in self.dns(domainname, 'SPF')]
return []
def dns_mx(self, domainname):
"""Get a list of IP addresses for all MX exchanges for a
domain name.
"""
# RFC 4408 section 5.4 "mx"
# To prevent DoS attacks, more than 10 MX names MUST NOT be looked up
mxnames = self.dns(domainname, 'MX')
if self.strict:
max = MAX_MX
if self.strict > 1:
if len(mxnames) > MAX_MX:
raise AmbiguityWarning(
'More than %d MX records returned'%MAX_MX)
if len(mxnames) == 0:
raise AmbiguityWarning(
'No MX records found for mx mechanism', domainname)
else:
max = MAX_MX * 4
return [a for mx in mxnames[:max] for a in self.dns_a(mx[1],self.A)]
def dns_a(self, domainname, A='A'):
"""Get a list of IP addresses for a domainname.
"""
if not domainname: return []
if self.strict > 1:
alist = self.dns(domainname, A)
if len(alist) == 0:
raise AmbiguityWarning(
'No %s records found for'%A, domainname)
else:
return alist
return self.dns(domainname, A)
def validated_ptrs(self):
"""Figure out the validated PTR domain names for the connect IP."""
# To prevent DoS attacks, more than 10 PTR names MUST NOT be looked up
if self.strict:
max = MAX_PTR
if self.strict > 1:
#Break out the number of PTR records returned for testing
try:
ptrnames = self.dns_ptr(self.i)
if len(ptrnames) > max:
warning = 'More than %d PTR records returned' % max
raise AmbiguityWarning(warning, i)
else:
if len(ptrnames) == 0:
raise AmbiguityWarning(
'No PTR records found for ptr mechanism', self.c)
except:
raise AmbiguityWarning(
'No PTR records found for ptr mechanism', i)
else:
max = MAX_PTR * 4
cidrlength = self.cidrmax
return [p for p in self.dns_ptr(self.i)[:max]
if self.cidrmatch(self.dns_a(p,self.A),cidrlength)]
def dns_ptr(self, i):
"""Get a list of domain names for an IP address."""
return self.dns('%s.%s.arpa'%(reverse_dots(i),self.v), 'PTR')
# We have to be careful which additional DNS RRs we cache. For
# instance, PTR records are controlled by the connecting IP, and they
# could poison our local cache with bogus A and MX records.
SAFE2CACHE = {
('MX','A'): None,
('MX','MX'): None,
('CNAME','A'): None,
('CNAME','CNAME'): None,
('A','A'): None,
('AAAA','AAAA'): None,
('PTR','PTR'): None,
('TXT','TXT'): None,
('SPF','SPF'): None
}
def dns(self, name, qtype, cnames=None):
"""DNS query.
If the result is in cache, return that. Otherwise pull the
result from DNS, and cache ALL answers, so additional info
is available for further queries later.
CNAMEs are followed.
If there is no data, [] is returned.
pre: qtype in ['A', 'AAAA', 'MX', 'PTR', 'TXT', 'SPF']
post: isinstance(__return__, types.ListType)
"""
result = self.cache.get( (name, qtype) )
cname = None
if not result:
safe2cache = query.SAFE2CACHE
for k, v in DNSLookup(name, qtype, self.strict):
if k == (name, 'CNAME'):
cname = v
if (qtype,k[1]) in safe2cache:
self.cache.setdefault(k, []).append(v)
result = self.cache.get( (name, qtype), [])
if not result and cname:
if not cnames:
cnames = {}
elif len(cnames) >= MAX_CNAME:
#return result # if too many == NX_DOMAIN
raise PermError('Length of CNAME chain exceeds %d' % MAX_CNAME)
cnames[name] = cname
if cname in cnames:
raise PermError, 'CNAME loop'
result = self.dns(cname, qtype, cnames=cnames)
return result
def cidrmatch(self, ipaddrs, n):
"""Match connect IP against a list of other IP addresses."""
try:
if self.v == 'ip6':
MASK = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFL
bin = bin2long6
else:
MASK = 0xFFFFFFFFL
bin = addr2bin
c = ~(MASK >> n) & MASK & self.ip
for ip in [bin(ip) for ip in ipaddrs]:
if c == ~(MASK >> n) & MASK & ip: return True
except socket.error: pass
return False
def get_header(self, res, receiver=None):
if not receiver:
receiver = self.r
if res in ('pass', 'fail',' softfail'):
return '%s (%s: %s) client-ip=%s; envelope-from=%s; helo=%s;' % (
res, receiver, self.get_header_comment(res), self.c,
self.l + '@' + self.o, self.h)
if res == 'permerror':
return '%s (%s: %s)' % (' '.join([res] + self.mech),
receiver,self.get_header_comment(res))
return '%s (%s: %s)' % (res, receiver, self.get_header_comment(res))
def get_header_comment(self, res):
"""Return comment for Received-SPF header.
"""
sender = self.o
if res == 'pass':
return \
"domain of %s designates %s as permitted sender" \
% (sender, self.c)
elif res == 'softfail': return \
"transitioning domain of %s does not designate %s as permitted sender" \
% (sender, self.c)
elif res == 'neutral': return \
"%s is neither permitted nor denied by domain of %s" \
% (self.c, sender)
elif res == 'none': return \
"%s is neither permitted nor denied by domain of %s" \
% (self.c, sender)
#"%s does not designate permitted sender hosts" % sender
elif res == 'permerror': return \
"permanent error in processing domain of %s: %s" \
% (sender, self.prob)
elif res == 'error': return \
"temporary error in processing during lookup of %s" % sender
elif res == 'fail': return \
"domain of %s does not designate %s as permitted sender" \
% (sender, self.c)
raise ValueError("invalid SPF result for header comment: "+res)
def split_email(s, h):
"""Given a sender email s and a HELO domain h, create a valid tuple
(l, d) local-part and domain-part.
Examples:
>>> split_email('', 'wayforward.net')
('postmaster', 'wayforward.net')
>>> split_email('foo.com', 'wayforward.net')
('postmaster', 'foo.com')
>>> split_email('terry@wayforward.net', 'optsw.com')
('terry', 'wayforward.net')
"""
if not s:
return 'postmaster', h
else:
parts = s.split('@', 1)
if parts[0] == '':
parts[0] = 'postmaster'
if len(parts) == 2:
return tuple(parts)
else:
return 'postmaster', s
def parse_mechanism(str, d):
"""Breaks A, MX, IP4, and PTR mechanisms into a (name, domain,
cidr,cidr6) tuple. The domain portion defaults to d if not present,
the cidr defaults to 32 if not present.
Examples:
>>> parse_mechanism('a', 'foo.com')
('a', 'foo.com', None, None)
>>> parse_mechanism('a:bar.com', 'foo.com')
('a', 'bar.com', None, None)
>>> parse_mechanism('a/24', 'foo.com')
('a', 'foo.com', 24, None)
>>> parse_mechanism('A:foo:bar.com/16', 'foo.com')
('a', 'foo:bar.com', 16, None)
>>> parse_mechanism('-exists:%{i}.%{s1}.100/86400.rate.%{d}','foo.com')
('-exists', '%{i}.%{s1}.100/86400.rate.%{d}', None, None)
>>> parse_mechanism('mx:%%%_/.Claranet.de/27','foo.com')
('mx', '%%%_/.Claranet.de', 27, None)
>>> parse_mechanism('mx:%{d}/27','foo.com')
('mx', '%{d}', 27, None)
>>> parse_mechanism('iP4:192.0.0.0/8','foo.com')
('ip4', '192.0.0.0', 8, None)
"""
a = RE_DUAL_CIDR.split(str)
if len(a) == 3:
str, cidr6 = a[0], int(a[1])
else:
cidr6 = None
a = RE_CIDR.split(str)
if len(a) == 3:
str, cidr = a[0], int(a[1])
else:
cidr = None
a = str.split(':', 1)
if len(a) < 2:
return str.lower(), d, cidr, cidr6
return a[0].lower(), a[1], cidr, cidr6
def reverse_dots(name):
"""Reverse dotted IP addresses or domain names.
Example:
>>> reverse_dots('192.168.0.145')
'145.0.168.192'
>>> reverse_dots('email.example.com')
'com.example.email'
"""
a = name.split('.')
a.reverse()
return '.'.join(a)
def domainmatch(ptrs, domainsuffix):
"""grep for a given domain suffix against a list of validated PTR
domain names.
Examples:
>>> domainmatch(['FOO.COM'], 'foo.com')
1
>>> domainmatch(['moo.foo.com'], 'FOO.COM')
1
>>> domainmatch(['moo.bar.com'], 'foo.com')
0
"""
domainsuffix = domainsuffix.lower()
for ptr in ptrs:
ptr = ptr.lower()
if ptr == domainsuffix or ptr.endswith('.' + domainsuffix):
return True
return False
def addr2bin(str):
"""Convert a string IPv4 address into an unsigned integer.
Examples::
>>> addr2bin('127.0.0.1')
2130706433L
>>> addr2bin('127.0.0.1') == socket.INADDR_LOOPBACK
1
>>> addr2bin('255.255.255.254')
4294967294L
>>> addr2bin('192.168.0.1')
3232235521L
Unlike DNS.addr2bin, the n, n.n, and n.n.n forms for IP addresses
are handled as well::
>>> addr2bin('10.65536')
167837696L
>>> 10 * (2 ** 24) + 65536
167837696
>>> addr2bin('10.93.512')
173867520L
>>> 10 * (2 ** 24) + 93 * (2 ** 16) + 512
173867520
"""
return struct.unpack("!L", socket.inet_aton(str))[0]
def bin2long6(str):
h, l = struct.unpack("!QQ", str)
return h << 64 | l
if socket.has_ipv6:
def inet_ntop(s):
return socket.inet_ntop(socket.AF_INET6,s)
def inet_pton(s):
return socket.inet_pton(socket.AF_INET6,s)
else:
def inet_ntop(s):
"""Convert ip6 address to standard hex notation.
Examples:
>>> inet_ntop(struct.pack("!HHHHHHHH",0,0,0,0,0,0xFFFF,0x0102,0x0304))
'::FFFF:1.2.3.4'
>>> inet_ntop(struct.pack("!HHHHHHHH",0x1234,0x5678,0,0,0,0,0x0102,0x0304))
'1234:5678::102:304'
>>> inet_ntop(struct.pack("!HHHHHHHH",0,0,0,0x1234,0x5678,0,0x0102,0x0304))
'::1234:5678:0:102:304'
>>> inet_ntop(struct.pack("!HHHHHHHH",0x1234,0x5678,0,0x0102,0x0304,0,0,0))
'1234:5678:0:102:304::'
>>> inet_ntop(struct.pack("!HHHHHHHH",0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0))
'::'
"""
# convert to 8 words
a = struct.unpack("!HHHHHHHH",s)
n = (0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) # null ip6
if a == n: return '::'
# check for ip4 mapped
if a[:5] == (0,0,0,0,0) and a[5] in (0,0xFFFF):
ip4 = '.'.join([str(i) for i in struct.unpack("!HHHHHHBBBB",s)[6:]])
if a[5]:
return "::FFFF:" + ip4
return "::" + ip4
# find index of longest sequence of 0
for l in (7,6,5,4,3,2,1):
e = n[:l]
for i in range(9-l):
if a[i:i+l] == e:
if i == 0:
return ':'+':%x'*(8-l) % a[l:]
if i == 8 - l:
return '%x:'*(8-l) % a[:-l] + ':'
return '%x:'*i % a[:i] + ':%x'*(8-l-i) % a[i+l:]
return "%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x" % a
def inet_pton(p):
"""Convert ip6 standard hex notation to ip6 address.
Examples:
>>> struct.unpack('!HHHHHHHH',inet_pton('::'))
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
>>> struct.unpack('!HHHHHHHH',inet_pton('::1234'))
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4660)
>>> struct.unpack('!HHHHHHHH',inet_pton('1234::'))
(4660, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
>>> struct.unpack('!HHHHHHHH',inet_pton('1234::5678'))
(4660, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 22136)
>>> struct.unpack('!HHHHHHHH',inet_pton('::FFFF:1.2.3.4'))
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 65535, 258, 772)
>>> struct.unpack('!HHHHHHHH',inet_pton('1.2.3.4'))
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 65535, 258, 772)
>>> try: inet_pton('::1.2.3.4.5')
... except ValueError,x: print x
::1.2.3.4.5
"""
if p == '::':
return '\0'*16
s = p
m = RE_IP4.search(s)
try:
if m:
pos = m.start()
ip4 = [int(i) for i in s[pos:].split('.')]
if not pos:
return struct.pack('!QLBBBB',0,65535,*ip4)
s = s[:pos]+'%x%02x:%x%02x'%tuple(ip4)
a = s.split('::')
if len(a) == 2:
l,r = a
if not l:
r = r.split(':')
return struct.pack('!HHHHHHHH',
*[0]*(8-len(r)) + [int(s,16) for s in r])
if not r:
l = l.split(':')
return struct.pack('!HHHHHHHH',
*[int(s,16) for s in l] + [0]*(8-len(l)))
l = l.split(':')
r = r.split(':')
return struct.pack('!HHHHHHHH',
*[int(s,16) for s in l] + [0]*(8-len(l)-len(r))
+ [int(s,16) for s in r])
if len(a) == 1:
return struct.pack('!HHHHHHHH',
*[int(s,16) for s in a[0].split(':')])
except ValueError: pass
raise ValueError,p
def expand_one(expansion, str, joiner):
if not str:
return expansion
ln, reverse, delimiters = RE_ARGS.split(str)[1:4]
if not delimiters:
delimiters = '.'
expansion = split(expansion, delimiters, joiner)
if reverse: expansion.reverse()
if ln: expansion = expansion[-int(ln)*2+1:]
return ''.join(expansion)
def split(str, delimiters, joiner=None):
"""Split a string into pieces by a set of delimiter characters. The
resulting list is delimited by joiner, or the original delimiter if
joiner is not specified.
Examples:
>>> split('192.168.0.45', '.')
['192', '.', '168', '.', '0', '.', '45']
>>> split('terry@wayforward.net', '@.')
['terry', '@', 'wayforward', '.', 'net']
>>> split('terry@wayforward.net', '@.', '.')
['terry', '.', 'wayforward', '.', 'net']
"""
result, element = [], ''
for c in str:
if c in delimiters:
result.append(element)
element = ''
if joiner:
result.append(joiner)
else:
result.append(c)
else:
element += c
result.append(element)
return result
def insert_libspf_local_policy(spftxt, local=None):
"""Returns spftxt with local inserted just before last non-fail
mechanism. This is how the libspf{2} libraries handle "local-policy".
Examples:
>>> insert_libspf_local_policy('v=spf1 -all')
'v=spf1 -all'
>>> insert_libspf_local_policy('v=spf1 -all','mx')
'v=spf1 -all'
>>> insert_libspf_local_policy('v=spf1','a mx ptr')
'v=spf1 a mx ptr'
>>> insert_libspf_local_policy('v=spf1 mx -all','a ptr')
'v=spf1 mx a ptr -all'
>>> insert_libspf_local_policy('v=spf1 mx -include:foo.co +all','a ptr')
'v=spf1 mx a ptr -include:foo.co +all'
# FIXME: is this right? If so, "last non-fail" is a bogus description.
>>> insert_libspf_local_policy('v=spf1 mx ?include:foo.co +all','a ptr')
'v=spf1 mx a ptr ?include:foo.co +all'
>>> spf='v=spf1 ip4:1.2.3.4 -a:example.net -all'
>>> local='ip4:192.0.2.3 a:example.org'
>>> insert_libspf_local_policy(spf,local)
'v=spf1 ip4:1.2.3.4 ip4:192.0.2.3 a:example.org -a:example.net -all'
"""
# look to find the all (if any) and then put local
# just after last non-fail mechanism. This is how
# libspf2 handles "local policy", and some people
# apparently find it useful (don't ask me why).
if not local: return spftxt
spf = spftxt.split()[1:]
if spf:
# local policy is SPF mechanisms/modifiers with no
# 'v=spf1' at the start
spf.reverse() #find the last non-fail mechanism
for mech in spf:
# map '?' '+' or '-' to 'neutral' 'pass'
# or 'fail'
if not RESULTS.get(mech[0]):
# actually finds last mech with default result
where = spf.index(mech)
spf[where:where] = [local]
spf.reverse()
local = ' '.join(spf)
break
else:
return spftxt # No local policy adds for v=spf1 -all
# Processing limits not applied to local policy. Suggest
# inserting 'local' mechanism to handle this properly
#MAX_LOOKUP = 100
return 'v=spf1 '+local
def _test():
import doctest, spf
return doctest.testmod(spf)
DNS.DiscoverNameServers() # Fails on Mac OS X? Add domain to /etc/resolv.conf
if __name__ == '__main__':
import sys
if len(sys.argv) == 1:
print USAGE
_test()
elif len(sys.argv) == 2:
q = query(i='127.0.0.1', s='localhost', h='unknown',
receiver=socket.gethostname())
print q.dns_spf(sys.argv[1])
elif len(sys.argv) == 4:
print check(i=sys.argv[1], s=sys.argv[2], h=sys.argv[3],
receiver=socket.gethostname())
elif len(sys.argv) == 5:
i, s, h = sys.argv[2:]
q = query(i=i, s=s, h=h, receiver=socket.gethostname(),
strict=False)
print q.check(sys.argv[1])
if q.perm_error and q.perm_error.ext:
print q.perm_error.ext
else:
print USAGE
spfquery.py deleted 100755 → 0
+ 0
− 99
View file @ 8f5513a5
#!/usr/bin/python2.3
# Author: Stuart D. Gathman <stuart@bmsi.com>
# Copyright 2004 Business Management Systems, Inc.
# This code is under the GNU General Public License. See COPYING for details.
# $Log$
# Revision 1.1.1.1 2005/05/31 18:07:19 customdesigned
# Release 0.6.9
#
# Revision 2.3 2004/04/19 22:12:11 stuart
# Release 0.6.9
#
# Revision 2.2 2004/04/18 03:29:35 stuart
# Pass most tests except -local and -rcpt-to
#
# Revision 2.1 2004/04/08 18:41:15 stuart
# Reject numeric hello names
#
# Driver for SPF test system
import spf
import sys
from optparse import OptionParser
class PerlOptionParser(OptionParser):
def _process_args (self, largs, rargs, values):
"""_process_args(largs : [string],
rargs : [string],
values : Values)
Process command-line arguments and populate 'values', consuming
options and arguments from 'rargs'. If 'allow_interspersed_args' is
false, stop at the first non-option argument. If true, accumulate any
interspersed non-option arguments in 'largs'.
"""
while rargs:
arg = rargs[0]
# We handle bare "--" explicitly, and bare "-" is handled by the
# standard arg handler since the short arg case ensures that the
# len of the opt string is greater than 1.
if arg == "--":
del rargs[0]
return
elif arg[0:2] == "--":
# process a single long option (possibly with value(s))
self._process_long_opt(rargs, values)
elif arg[:1] == "-" and len(arg) > 1:
# process a single perl style long option
rargs[0] = '-' + arg
self._process_long_opt(rargs, values)
elif self.allow_interspersed_args:
largs.append(arg)
del rargs[0]
else:
return
def format(q):
res,code,txt = q.check()
print res
if res in ('pass','neutral','unknown'): print
else: print txt
print 'spfquery:',q.get_header_comment(res)
print 'Received-SPF:',q.get_header(res,'spfquery')
def main(argv):
parser = PerlOptionParser()
parser.add_option("--file",dest="file")
parser.add_option("--ip",dest="ip")
parser.add_option("--sender",dest="sender")
parser.add_option("--helo",dest="hello_name")
parser.add_option("--local",dest="local_policy")
parser.add_option("--rcpt-to",dest="rcpt")
parser.add_option("--default-explanation",dest="explanation")
parser.add_option("--sanitize",type="int",dest="sanitize")
parser.add_option("--debug",type="int",dest="debug")
opts,args = parser.parse_args(argv)
if opts.ip:
q = spf.query(opts.ip,opts.sender,opts.hello_name,local=opts.local_policy)
if opts.explanation:
q.set_default_explanation(opts.explanation)
format(q)
if opts.file:
if opts.file == '0':
fp = sys.stdin
else:
fp = open(opts.file,'r')
for ln in fp:
ip,sender,helo,rcpt = ln.split(None,3)
q = spf.query(ip,sender,helo,local=opts.local_policy)
if opts.explanation:
q.set_default_explanation(opts.explanation)
format(q)
fp.close()
if __name__ == "__main__":
import sys
main(sys.argv[1:])
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